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The Use of Expert Testimony in Federal Criminal Terrorism
Prosecutions: A Critical Look

"His watchmen are blind, all of them know nothing. All of them are
mute dogs unable to bark, Dreamers lying down, who love to slumber"- I

Introduction
After the al Qaeda attacks of September I l, 2001, the U.S. Department
of Justice named terrorism prevention its number-one mission. 2 Since the 9/11
attacks, 881 terrorism defendants have been prosecuted by the U.S.
Department of Justice. 3 580 defendants have pleaded guilty to charges, while

1

2

Isaiah 56: 10

Adam Clymer, How Sept. 1 1 Changed Goals of the Justice Dept., N.Y. Times (Feb.
28, 2002), https://www.nytimes. com/2002/02/28/us/how-sept-11 -changed-goals-of-justicedept.html.
The Intercept, Trial and Terror, Updated March 9, 2019 https://trialandterror.theintercept.com. These figures are for "international terrorism" as opposed to "domestic
terrorism". The FBI defines "international terrorism" as "perpetrated by individuals and/or groups
inspired by or associated with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations
(statesponsored)",even
when
the
crimes
were
committed
in
the
US,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism, accessed April 30, 2019.The Department of Justice uses
a similar definition, U.S. Dep't of Just., Counterterrorism White Paper, 59 (June 2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf. The subject matter
of this article is "international terrorism", and the terms "terror" and "terrorism" refer to
"international terrorism" so defined. These distinctions and definitions by the Justice Department
have engendered much controversy. For a critical look and a good discussion of these definitions,
see Michael German and Sara Robinson, Wrong Priorities on Fighting Terrorism, The Brennan

Center for Justice, October 2018. (Arguing that these definitions result in "arbitrary distinctions
between terrorism based on race, ethnicity, and ideology"). See also Trevor Aaronson, Terrorism
's

the courts found 188 guilty at trial. Just 3 have been acquitted and 4 have seen
their charges dropped or dismissed, giving the Justice Department a near4
perfect record of conviction in terrorism cases.
The use of expert testimony at trial is a critical component of this
success.5 In this article, we attempt to describe the ways and for what purposes
this testimony is offered, how court's generally rule and analyze admissibility
under Daubert,6 Kumho Tire, 7 and FRE 702. We also take a close look at
some of the experts who frequently testify for the prosecution and discuss the
criticism of their methods and methodologies by many within the academic
community.

Double Standard- Violent, Far Right Extremists Are Rarely Prosecuted as Terrorists, The
Intercept, March 23, 2019, hups://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbiprosecutions, accessed April 30, 2019.

The Intercept, Trial and Terror, (full cite in footnote 2).
See Bob Hennelly, In High-Profile Cases, Tapping Terror Experts for
Testimony Becomes De Rigueur, https://www.wnyc.org/story/204948-high-profile-casestapping-terrorexperts-testimony-becomes-de-rigueur/, last accessed May 12, 2019.
6
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
4
5

7

Kumho Tire co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.s. 137 (1999)

A good part of our discussion will be devoted to the testimony of Evan
Kohlmann, the governments " Wunderkind'8 expert and star witness in over
twenty-two federal terrorism prosecutions.9
Although a good amount of the analysis and critical discussion focuses
on Kohlmann's testimony, our primary goal is not to demonstrate that
Kohlmann is not qualified to testify as an expert, but rather to argue that
District Courts and Appellate Courts have abdicated their critical "gate
keeping function" under Daubert

10

and Kumho Tire, ll in allowing his and

other questionable experts to provide expert testimony. Specifically, courts
have failed to apply the five "Daubert factors", (1) whether the theory or
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its known or potential error rate;

(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and

s

See, Wesley Yang, The Terrorist Search Engine, New York Mag., Dec. 13, 2010
(referring to Kohlmann as "the Doogie Howser of Terrorism" and discussing Kohlmannis

credentials that led to his certification as an expert witness in over twenty high profile terrorism
prosecutions)
9
See, Wadie E. Said, Constructing the Threat and the Role oflhe Expert Witness,
44 Conn. L. Rev. 1545 (2012), n. 28 and accompanying text. It should be noted that this data is
from 2012 and was provided on Kohlmann's own, now defunct, website.
Daubert at 597. The text accompanying supra, note I is intended to express this
conclusion.
Il
526 U.s. 137 (1999)
10

(5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community. 1
To properly understand the context and purposes for which expert
testimony is used in terrorism prosecutions, it is important to understand the
statutory scheme under which terrorism defendants are charged. In 1994, the
first material support for terrorism prohibition, codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339A
was passed by Congress. 23 Statute 18 U.S.C. SS 2339A criminalizes material
support that facilitates the commission of any one of 57 previously enacted
terrorism-related offenses, which are explicitly listed in the statute.

14

Two

years later, Congress enacted the second material support prohibition codified
at 18 U.S.C. 2339B.

4

The central distinction between the two material

support prohibitions is that where 2339A criminalizes material support for

1

Daubert at 592-595.
2

3

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.

, 108 state. 1796, 2022-23 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339A (2012)). 14 Id.
4

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 303,

110 State. 1214, 1250-53 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339B (2012))

certain defined terrorism crimes, both international and domestic, 2339B
criminalizes material support to certain designated foreign terrorist
organizations. 5 The two federal material support statutes have been at the
heart of the Justice Department's terrorist prosecution efforts. 6 Since the
attacks on 9/11, 448 or 51 percent of all terrorism defendants prosecuted by
the Justice Department have been charged with material support to a foreign
terrorist organization.

18

The "material support" prohibitions are often front

and central to the expert testimony and we therefore devote a section to a
discussion of the "material support" statutes. 78

Part One: Meet our Expert- "The Doogie Howser of
Terrorism
Evan Kohlmann owes his terrorism education to a think tank called
the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), where he began work as an

5
6

Id.
A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act: Hearing

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 109th Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (2005) (statement of Barry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice)
18
The Intercept, supra note 4.

see, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 483 (5th Cir. 201 1). see also said,
supra note 9 (discussing the central role played by the expert witness's in the governments
7

successful prosecution).
8
See Yang, supra note 8.

intern in 1998, during his freshman year at Georgetown. 9 IPT was founded
by Steve Emerson, a former journalist who spent the nineties warning of the
Islamicmilitancy

threat

and

assailing

a

Middle

Eastern—studies

Establishment inclined to mince words over whether Islamic militancy
deserved the label "terrorism" at all.10 He was a polarizing figure, regarded as
an Islamophobic alarmist by many 11 —he famously described the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings by Timothy McVeigh as exhibiting a "Middle
Eastern trait" because it "was done with the intent to inflict as many casualties
as possible"24—but credited for paying attention to the threat of Islamic
terrorism
when others were inclined to downplay it. Prior to 9/11, he had the ear of top
White House counterterrorism official Richard Clarke, who has written that

Id. See also, Vanessa Blum, Terror Analyst's Credentials Questioned, South Florida
SunSentinel, August 27, 2006, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2006-08-270608260349storv.html last accessed May 9, 2019.
10
Yang, supra note 7
9

11

In reviewing Emerson's book "Terrorist" for the New York Times Book Review,

Adrienne Edgar said it was "marred by factual errors (such as mistranslation of Arabic names)
that betray an unfamiliarity with the Middle East, and by a pervasive anti-Arab and antiPalestinian bias." Adrienne Edgar, "Terrorist", The New York Times Book Review, May 19,
1991. See also, Carl Ernst, "Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance ", Palgrave
Macmillan. p. 86 (2013) (describing
Islamophobic discourse").

24

Emerson as one of the "most prominent producers of

John Sugg, Steven Emerson 's Crusade, FAIR, January l, 1999,
https://fair.org/extra/steven-emersons-crusade/, accessed May 8, 2019. These comments seem to
have been made on CBS News.

Emerson would provide him information on jihad that he could not get out of
his own intelligence agencies.12
In January 2015, following terrorist attacks in Paris, France, Emerson
stated in an interview on Fox News that the city of Birmingham was
populated entirely by Muslims and was a "no go area" for non-Muslims.13 In
the same interview, he claimed that in London, "Muslim religious police beat
anyone who doesn't dress according to Muslim, religious Muslim attire".

27

He described Birmingham as one of a number of European cities "where
sharia courts were set up, where Muslim density is very intense, where the
police don't go in, and where it's basically a separate country almost, a country
within a country".28 In response, the Fox News host Jeanine Pirro said, "you
know
what it sounds like to me, Steve? It sounds like a caliphate within a particular
country. In response to these comments, British Prime Minister David
Cameron said that he "choked on his porridge" when he heard them and
observed that Emerson was "clearly a complete idiot Sir Albert Bore, the
leader of the council, mocked Emerson, writing "As I arrived for work at the

12

Clarke, Richard A., Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National

Security Disasters, Ecco, New York (2008), page 134.
13

BBC News, Apologvfor 'Muslim Birmingham' Fox News claim, January 12, 2015,
last accessed May 9, 2019.

Council House this morning I was full of awe and admiration for the many
commuters who braved the 'no-go area' that is now Birmingham city centre,
and described Emerson's remarks as "stupid, untrue and damaging,

27

Id

28
Matthew Holehouse, "David Cameron: US terror 'expert' Steve Emerson is
a 'complete idiot", The Daily Telegraph, January 12, 2015,
1 1340399/David-CameronUSterror-expert-Steve-Emerson-is-a-complete-idiot.html, last accessed May 9, 2019.

ridiculous".

14

29

Id

30

Id-

Emerson was forced to apologize for these remarks, saying he

had "relied on sources he had used in the past" who had proven faulty.15
He has claimed that President Obama is shielding former ISIS fighters
in the United States from FBI surveillance, and has repeatedly said that his
own truth-telling has made him an assassination target for Islamic
fundamentalists.16 When asked by a reporter some years ago whether there

14

Sir Albert Bore,

I Could Not Be Prouder ofBirmingham's Witty, Intelligent Response

to Fox News, Huffington Post, January 14, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/siralbertbore/fox-news-birmingham_b 6469024.html, last accessed May 13, 2019.
15
See BBC News, supra note 26.
16
Andrew O'hehir, Fox News' bogus CIA terror analystfed offa nation hooked on lies:
Wayne Simmons is a symptom of a much deeper disease, Salon.com, October 21, 2015, htt

was any truth to that, an unwary FBI agent responded: "No, none at
all".17Perhaps most importantly for our discussion, Emerson has no academic
or governmental credentials beyond his media celebrity, and does not claim
any.35
While at the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Kohlmann wrote what
would later become his book, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The
AfghanBosnian Network.

18

With only his book

19

and stint with the

Investigative Project on Terrorism as credentials, Kohlmann became an
expert witness for the Justice Department and a consultant for the FBI.2021 An
FBI agent described the baby-faced expert as "the Doogie Howser of
Terrorism, and George

s://mvw. alon.com/2015/10/20/fox news bo us cia terror anal st and a nation hooked o
n_lies_wayne simmons is_a_symptom_of_a_much deeper_disease/, last accessed May 9, 2019.
Id.
Trever Aaronson, A Terrorism Expert 's Secret Relationship with The FBI, The Intercept,
July
27,
2015,
https://theintercept.com/2015/07/27/doogie-huekster-terrorism-expertssecretrelationship-fbi/, last accessed May I l, 2019,
19
When Kohlmann began testifying, all he had was an undergraduate thesis, the book was
published later, see Yang supra note 8.
20
Aaronson, supra note 36.
21
Id.
17

18

Washington University law professor constitutional-law professor Jonathan
Turley described Kohlmann to New York magazine as having been "grown
hydroponically in the basement of the Bush Justice Department."22
Kohlmann does not speak Arabic; has never been to Iraq or
Afghanistan; does not hold a postgraduate degree in any related field; has no
experience in military, law-enforcement, or intelligence work; and continues
to submit his undergraduate thesis (now book) on Arab mujahidin in
Afghanistan as evidence of his expertise.41
The following exchange between Kohlmann and a defense lawyer
during cross examination is illustrative.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been to Afghanistan?
A. No, I have never been to Afghanistan.
Q. Do you speak Pashto?
A. No, I do not speak Pashto.
Q. That's a language used in Afghanistan?
A. In southern Afghanistan. That's correct; yes.

22

Yang, supra note 8. 41

Id.

Q. We've heard a lot of talk about Pakistan. Have you ever
been to Pakistan - A. No.
Q. -- once in your life?
A. No, I've never been to Pakistan.
Q. The language spoken in Pakistan is Urdu?
A. That's correct,
Q. You don't speak Urdu, do you?
A. NO.

Q. We've heard an awful lot of talk about the country of
Iraq. Have you ever in your life been to Iraq?
A. No, I haven't been to Iraq.
Q. One of the languages spoken in Iraq is Kurdish, is it not?
A. In a small portion of Iraq, yes.
Q. One of the languages spoken is Kurdish, right?
A. That's correct; yes.
Q. You don't speak Kurdish, do you?

A. No. No, I don't speak Kurdish.
Q. You have never been to Iran, have you?
A. No, I haven't been to Iran.
Q. And you don't speak Persian, do you?
A. No, I don't.
Q You have never been, in your life, to Syria, have you? A. No, I have
not.
Q. You've never been to Lebanon?
A. Not Lebanon, no.
Q. You've never been to Egypt?
A. That's correct.
Q. You've never been to Yemen?
A. That's correct.
Q. You're not fluent in reading Arabic, are you?
A. No, I'm not.
Q. You're not fluent in writing Arabic, are you?
A. That's correct.

Q. You're not fluent in speaking Arabic, are you?
A. I wouldn't claim to be, no. That's correct.23

Jonathan Turley said he was "astonished" by Kohlmann's slim
credentials after taking over a case in which he testified. "It seemed to me the
thinnest resume of anyone I'd ever encountered in a national security case,"
Turley said. "To this day, I'm not sure how he became an "expert. "43 Turley
is not the only one. In a court filing, Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist
and former CIA officer who has been called to the witness stand several times
to discredit Kohlmann's claims24, described his testimony and reports as "so
biased, one-sided and contextually inaccurate that they do not provide a fair
and balanced context for the specific evidence to be presented at a legal
hearing."45 Sageman also alleged in the same report that Kohlmann views
his expert testimony not as well-researched and settled science to be
discussed honestly at trial, but as a kind of information clay to be molded for
the prosecution's benefit. 25 Sageman wrote that "He selects what is most
supportive for the side that retains him. Indeed, he told me so at one time

Trial Transcript Day 27 Page 109-110, U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna, Docket number I :09cr10017, U.S.D.C. District of Massachusetts (2011 43 See Blum, supra note 21.
24
For example, Sageman testified for the defense in U.S. v, Mehanna, supra note 42.
45
Aaronson, supra note 36,
23

25

when I challenged him about his testimony in the [Hammad] Khurshid case
in Copenhagen, because he had neglected to mention important facts under
oath. He justified his one-sidedness by saying that it was an adversarial
process and it was up to the defense attorneys to cross examine him. 26
Phil Girardi, a former CIA Case Officer and Army Intelligence Officer
who spent twenty years overseas in Europe and the Middle East working
terrorism cases, has said that within the intelligence community and at the
Pentagon, Kohlmann, like many of his "expert colleagues", is widely
considered a phony who has ingratiated himself with those who prefer an
affable young media resource saying all the right things about terrorism,
alarming the public while exuding a "charade of expertise. 27
Kohlmann is not a traditional expert. Much of his research is not
peerreviewed. Kohlmann's key theory, to which he has testified several times
on the witness stand, involves a series of indicators that he claims determine
whether someone is likely a homegrown terrorist. Yet he has never tested the
theory against a randomly selected control group to account for bias or

26

Id.
Phil Girardi, Cashing in on Counter-Terrorism, The American Conservative, August I

27

l, 2015, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/anicles/cashing-in-on-counter-terrorism/, last
accessed May 9, 2019.

coincidence.28 Kohlmann has conceded that his terrorism indicators, and his
methodology in general, are not supported by any statistical analysis that
would prove their veracity.50
Aside from the criticism that focuses on Kohlmann's expertise and
qualifications to testify as an expert and accusations of his ideological bias,
perhaps unsurprisingly, his financial arrangement with the government and
in what other capacities he provides "services" to the government, have
attracted scrutiny as well.

51

This information is classified and generally

beyond the scope of what defense counsel can question him about. 52
While representing at trial Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, of the Finsbury
Park Mosque in London, defense lawyer Joshua Dratel, who has security
clearances, was given classified materials about Kohlmann, a witness in the
Mustafa prosecution. 53 However, the judge in the Mustafa case allowed very
limited references to the contents of the classified materials during Dratel's
cross-examination of Kohlmann — providing a clue to what the government
is hiding about its star terrorism expert. "You have done more than consulting
for the FBI, correct?" Dratel asked Kohlmann. "Correct," Kohlmann said
from the witness stand. "You have done more than act as an expert for the

28

U.S. V. Boyd, et al. Docket No. 5:09-CR-216-FL, Daubert Hearing Testimony by

Evan Kohlmann, Pages 96-102.

government, correct?" Dratel followed. "That's correct, yes," Kohlmann
admitted. That's as far as the judge would allow.29
The U.S. government has paid Kohlmann and his company at least $
1.4 million for testifying in trials around the country, assisting with FBI
investigations and consulting with agencies ranging from the Defense
Department to the Internal Revenue Service. He has also received another

benefit, 30Uncle Sam's mark of credibility, which has allowed him to work for
NBC News and its cable sibling, MSNBC, for more than a decade as an onair
"terrorism analyst.

Part Two: The Statutory Framework
In 1994, the first material support for terrorism prohibition, codified
at 18 U.S.C. 2339A was passed by Congress.

31

Statute 18 U.S.C. 2339A

Id.
Id. As far back as 2011, Kohlmann testified that he received over $1 million in fees from
various government agencies. He further testified that he charges between $350-400 per hour.
31
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
120005, 108 State. 1796, 2022-23 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339A (2012)).
29

30

criminalizes material support that facilitates the commission of any one of 57
previously enacted terrorism-related offenses, which are explicitly listed in
the statute. 32 Two years later, Congress enacted the second material support
prohibition codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339B33 . The central distinction between
the two material support prohibitions is that where 2339A criminalizes
material support for certain defined terrorism crimes, both international and
domestic, 2339B criminalizes material support to certain designated foreign
terrorist organizations" Since the attacks on 9/11, 448 or 51 percent of all
terrorism defendants prosecuted by the Justice Department have been charged
with material support to a foreign terrorist organization.60
Sections 2339B, the provision that bans providing material support to a
foreign terrorist organization (FTO), is, by the government's reckoning, the
most important statute employed in terrorism prosecutions.61 Norman Abrams
has described it as a "catch-all that can be invoked in widely varying situations
where individuals engage in conduct that may contribute in some way to the
commission of terrorist offenses.'962

32

Ida

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub, L. No. 104-132, sec. 303,
110 State. 1214, 1250-53 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2339B (2012)).
33

The original animating force behind the passage of the law was
simple—Congress was concerned that terrorist groups were raising money in
the United States under the cover of charitable activity.63 2339B was regarded
as an attempt to close the loophole left open by previous terrorismsupport
statutes; namely, it was designed as a tool to combat the purportedly pressing
problem of terrorist groups raising money for violence under the

59

Id.

The Intercept, supra note 3.
('i Ctr. On Law & Sec., N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law, Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 1
1, 2001—September I I , 201 1 13—14 (201 1), available at http://www.
60

62

Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derivedfrom
the (Early) Model PenalC0de, I J. NAT'L SEC. & POL'Y 5, 7 (2005).
63 Said, Wadie E., Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications Federal
Terrorism Prosecutions, Oxford University Press (2015), Page 51.

cover of charity. 34 The technical term "material support" involves not just
money but also "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personne13536 and transportation, except medicine or

34

Id. Page 52,

Interestingly, "personnel" can include oneself. People traveling to join an overseas terror
group can be charged with providing "personnel" under the statute.
36
U.S.C. S
35

religious materials.66 Unlike Section 2339A, S 2339B does not require any
intent to aid in the commission of a criminal offense. Any support, even if
given for humanitarian purposes, is a violation of 2339B. 37
The rationale of prohibiting any support, even for peaceful purposes is
a "money is fungible" type of argument. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"material support meant to promote peaceable, lawful conduct can be diverted
to advance terrorism in multiple ways. The record shows that designated
foreign terrorist organizations do not maintain organizational firewalls
between social, political, and terrorist operations, or financial firewalls
between funds raised for humanitarian activities and those used to carry out
terrorist attacks. Providing material support in any form would also undermine
cooperative international efforts to prevent terrorism and strain the United
States' relationships with its allies, including those that are defending
themselves against violent insurgencies waged by foreign terrorist groups.
The broad scope of Section 2339B came under constitutional attack in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 69 The lawsuit was a civil challenge by
individuals in the United States who wished to provide financial support and
specialized training, and engage in advocacy in service of the political and

37

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. I (2010).

humanitarian goals of two FTOs: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, a Sri Lankan rebel group, and the
PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in conflict with Turkey.

70

The plaintiffs

brought the lawsuit as a preemptive measure; rather than wait to be
prosecuted under 2339B, they challenged the statute's constitutionality, based
on the fact that the advocacy work they wished to pursue would likely expose
them to criminal liability under the law's terms.

71

By the time the dispute

made its way to the Supreme Court in 2010, the issues had been distilled into
a general challenge to the statute's criminalization of material support in the
form of speech under the First Amendment, as well as an argument that four
types of

at 23.

68
69

561 U.s. 1 (2010).

70

Id. at 3.

71

Id. at 10.

material support—"training," "expert advice or assistance, service," and
"personnel"—were unconstitutionality void for vagueness under the Fifth
Amendment. 38 All the support that the plaintiffs were attempting to provide

38

Ids

could be construed as protected speech under the First Amendment, and that
support went to the legitimate, as opposed to the illegal, goals of an F TO.

The Court ruled that material support, even in the form of speech or
association, could be criminalized because of its link to an FTO. 39 The Court
made a somewhat blurry distinction between "lawful independent advocacy"
and illegal material support in "coordination" with an FTO. 40

Part Three: Material Support and "Terrorism Experts" a
Toxic Mix
In this section we attempt to demonstrate the interplay between the
material support statutes and the use of "terrorism experts" illustrated by the
prosecution of Tarek Mehanna for violating the material support ban, and
unsurprisingly a case in which Evan Kohlmann's testimony was pivotal in
securing a conviction.

39

Id. 15-17.

Id. 30-33. The Court also rejected the void for vagueness challenge, as applied to the
facts of this case but left open the possibility of a different factual setting yielding a different
result, id. at 14, 18-24.
40

Mehanna, 31, was born in the United States to Egyptian immigrant
parents and grew up outside of Boston. He became a devout Muslim who was
fiercely critical of US foreign policy, especially in Muslim countries. He
believed deeply in the right of Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries
to defend against foreign occupation. And he talked about it. He subtitled
"jihadi" videos; he translated an archaic oft-translated Arabic text 39 Ways to
Serve and Participate in Jihad; and he engaged in religious and political
debate online through instant messages, e-mails and web postings. He also
traveled to Yemen for a brief trip in 2004—the government alleged he sought
to join a terrorist training camp, while Mehanna claimed he sought religious
and language instruction—but whatever he was looking for, he did not find
it, and he quickly returned home.41
To support the material support claim, the government offered two
theories of liability. First, the speech theory: The government's indictment
charged that Mehanna "created and/or translated, accepted credit for
authoring, and distributed text, videos, and other media, to inspire others to

Amna Akbar, How Tarek Mehanna Went to Prison for a Thought Crime, The Nation,
December 3 1, 2013, https://www.thenation.com/article/how-tarek-mehanna-went-prisonthoughtcrime/ last accessed May 14, 2019.
41

engage in violent jihad." 42The government continued to press this argument
in court even as it conceded that Mehanna did not translate or speak under Al
Qaeda's direction and presented no evidence that he acted at the group's
request, or even that he ever met or communicated with anyone from Al
Qaeda.43 The second theory of liability offered by the government is the travel
theory. The government argued that Mehanna traveled to Yemen in search of
a terrorist training camp so that he could prepare for battle against US troops
in Iraq. It pushed this theory even as it conceded that there were no terrorist
training camps in Yemen in 2004 and never Introduced evidence that
Mehanna had found one.78
To support the charges under the speech theory, the government had
to prove that the translations assisted Al- Qaeda in their recruiting efforts. On
the travel theory, the government had to show that Mehanna traveled to
Yemen for the purposes ofjoining a terror group. Kohlmann testified that the
kind of videos and documents that Mehanna translated and promoted online

USA v. Mehanna et al, Docket No. 1:09-cr-10017 (D. Mass. Jan 15, 2009), Criminal
Complaint filed November 7, 2008.
43
Akbar, supra note 75.
78 Id.
42

were a crucial function, allowing al-Qaida to recruit and incite young men to
violence.

The defense called Marc Sageman, a doctor as well as a sociologist,
and had been CIA case officer in Afghanistan coordinating America's covert
operation against the Soviet occupation.

79

Sageman has studied al-Qaida

from its birth in 1988; he knew and lived with all the major commanders of
the mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet army. He became a forensic
psychiatrist and has seen his writings included in Army training manuals. He
consults for the Defense Department, the Department of Homeland Security
and the CIA. He has classified security clearance; which government
witnesses don't have. 44 On the stand Sageman was questioned,
Does al-Qaida use the Internet to recruit?"
"No," he replied, "that's not how people join al-Qaida."
"How do people join?"
"It's really a bottom-up phenomenon," Sageman answered.

44

Id.

When questioned by defense attorneys about his methodology,
Sageman answered, "I use a scientific method".

David Boeri, In Mehanna Trial, Defense Saves The Star Witness For Last, WBUR
News, December 15, 2011, https://www.wbur.o@news/201 1/12/15/mehanna, last accessed May
15, 2019.

"And how does that compare with the government's witness, Mr.
Kohlmann?" she asked.
"He tells stories," Sageman replied.45

Conclusion

Prosecutions for terror related offenses reflect the legislature pushing
the boundaries of criminal conduct- in some cases beyond the constitution.
The executive branch engages in unethical conduct by using dubious
nonqualified experts. It is imperative that the judicial branch stand up to its

45

Id

constitutional role and restrain these abuses. Courts have abdicated their
critical "gatekeeping function" by allowing in "junk science" that virtually
assure a conviction. Perhaps Isaiah said it best, "His watchmen are blind, all
of them know nothing. All of them are mute dogs unable to bark, Dreamers
lying down, who love to slumber"-

